Contemplating Iran's next move

Perceptions and communications will determine whether this crisis will spin out of control, but there is reason not to expect the worst

Israelis have been on edge this past week bracing for an anticipated strike by Iran. Reports are grim, like the U.S. saying it expects Iran to hit multiple targets in Israel. A lot of threats are being aired, with the Israeli military warning Iran it will “bear the consequences for choosing to escalate the situation any further.”

War looms in the air – Israel just canceled all educational activities for Sunday – but the world has seen worse – the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 comes to mind. That 13-day crisis was triggered when the Soviets secretly deployed in Cuba nuclear missiles that could reach the entire continental U.S., and the United States responded by imposing a naval blockade. It ended after secret negotiations led to the pullout of the missiles in exchange for the U.S. removing missiles from Turkey. To me, two components vital to resolving the Cuban missile crisis may be missing in the Israeli-Iranian crisis: proper perception of the problem and communication. Hopefully, they are present, but the information is unavailable to the mortal man, as Paul Simon once sang. Assuming they are, there is reason not to expect the worst, even amid the danger. If so, then it becomes a matter of adhering to crisis management strategies.

Perception

My favorite work on crisis management strategies was written by Alexander George. He explains how crises begin when one adversary tries to change the status quo and the other adversary uses force to resist the change. That force can be diplomatic coercion but may escalate to threats and limited use of violence. In 1969, Israel and Jordan had a crisis over water and security. Israel bombed the East Ghor Canal (today the King Abdullah Canal), knocking it out of commission. But through secret negotiations, Jordan was able to rebuild the canal and agreements were made over water and security issues without further escalation.

“Once a crisis is set into motion, each side feels impelled to do what is needed to protect or advance its most important interests; at the same time, however, it recognizes that it must avoid utilizing options and actions for this purpose that could trigger unwanted escalation of the crisis,” he wrote. “This is the policy dilemma of crisis management.”

The way out requires a mutual use of restraint – using limited means to obtain limited objectives. Each side has to accept some damage to its interests in favor of protecting the most important interests. If both adversaries refuse to allow the other a way to back down from the crisis, it is more likely to end in a full-blown war.

This is where perception is key – namely perception of the adversary and perception of one’s own interests. Is the adversary committed to a military confrontation or using force and violence to attain a political objective? How will responding or not responding affect my political standing at home, in the region and in the international community?

Sometimes, it can end in war. The Six-Day War began with a three-week crisis triggered by Egypt ordering UN peacekeepers to leave Sinai and blocked the Straits of Tiran, the only passage for Israeli ships to access the Indian Ocean from Eilat. The Soviets never communicated to the Israelis that Egypt was not in a position to make a first strike, and Israel never communicated an ultimatum. Rather than accept any damage to its interests and fearing Arab intentions, it attacked first.

Personally, for all the rhetoric, the evidence suggests that Iran is more committed to destabilizing Israel politically than destroying Israel at all costs. To wit:

·      Unlike Hamas but much like Hezbollah, Iran is more concerned with regime preservation and administering rule, as I explained in my recent blog

·      Iran has much to lose and little to gain, given Israel’s strategic advantage, distance and potential support from the United States

·      Iran has paid a smaller price by using proxies and avoiding direct involvement

·      The Iranians, who are Persian Shi’ites, have no ideological interest in putting itself at great risk just so Hamas, whom they consider a bunch of heretical Arab Sunnis, can rule Palestine

·      Israel has stolen many documents from Iran but never found any plans to launch a strike, as opposed to the Hamas Jericho Wall plan it obtained in 2022

·      Iran passed up on the chance to attack Israel at its most vulnerable moment on October 7

Therefore, I perceive the Iran crisis as a political problem requiring a political solution. However, Israel’s government seems to perceive Iran as a military problem calling for military action. By striking the Iranian embassy in Damascus and killing top general Mohammed Reza Zahedi, Israel crossed a line that provokes Iran into making some response. As U.S. Secretary of State Robert McNamara, reflecting on the Cuban missile crisis, warned, “There’s a great danger when you try to solve political problems with military action.” He should know. When the Cuban crisis broke out, and President Kennedy consulted with his top advisers, Dean Acheson, McNamara’s predecessor, had advocated a limited military strike. He imagined that after an exchange of strikes, “cooler heads” might prevail. Looking back, that would likely have been a disastrous strategy. Can cooler heads still prevail here? Possibly, but this is where communication is crucial.

Communication

Following Israel’s escalation, the ball is in Iran’s court how to respond, which is why Israel is freaking out. Iran probably feels obliged to respond to protect its interests. Making no response harms Iran’s reputation and invites Israel to strike any Iranian target at any time.

At the same time, analysts (using at least in part the above logic) expect Iran’s response to be measured, according to news reports. This makes sense given the likelihood of Iran’s interest in preventing the crisis from spinning out of hand. To do that however, Iran must communicate its intentions to Israel, through whatever channel available. It wouldn’t be the first time in this region.

Hezbollah took such a route in 2015, after Israel struck a convoy in Syria that killed one of its leaders, Jihad Mughniyeh, and others. Hezbollah retaliated by attacking Har Dov and then communicated to Israel that it considered the matter over. Iran could do the same thing should it retaliate for the death of Zahedi. That would send a message to Prime Minister Netanyahu that it will respond to Israeli attempts to change the rules of engagement in kind with a “tit for tat” response.

Back in 2015, as I wrote in an opinion piece in Haaretz, cool heads prevailed. Netanyahu ignored the call of then-Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman to retaliate for the Har Dov attack. As a result, the northern border remained calm. Would Netanyahu do the same now? He’s a different person, more desperate to defend his reputation in the wake of his failure to protect Israelis from the Hamas massacre of October 7.

Perhaps the beating of the drums will also suffice. Israel’s visible preparations are a strategy that shows resolve. When Israel prepared for a possible Hamas attack before last Yom Kippur induced Hamas to stand down at that point. Only when Israel withdrew troops from the border did Hamas attack.

After all, it’s when there is no communications and no overt threat that war is at greatest risk. This region has practically only seen wars when they were preceded by radio silence or a staged crisis – be it 1956 (Israel’s surprise attack on Egypt), 1967 (ditto), 1973 (Egypt’s surprise attack on Israel), 1982 (Israel’s invasion of Lebanon) or 2023 (the Hamas massacre).

As it is, the Iranians are probably enjoying watching the Israelis panic. In that regard, they may not feel the need to attack now. They can sit back and let Israel remain on pins and needles, which carries a lot less risk than starting a war.

Nothing is written in stone, but how events will play out ride on the above ifs. If both sides perceive the problem as a political one not a military one, and if they can communicate their intentions at least through back channels, there is no reason for this current crisis to heat up into war. A tit-for-tat response is to be expected as the price for escalation; further escalation, made out of fear rather than rational thinking, serves neither side’s interests.

Note to my dear readers: I’ll see you in three weeks. I’m taking a writing vacation for Passover.