It's not too late: Israel's options to mitigate starvation in Gaza

Some readers reasonably question what Israel could have done differently to avoid the humanitarian crisis. Lessons from Raqqa and Sri Lanka offer answers, some with side benefits for Israel

After my last post about starvation in Gaza, I received some pushback that I absolutely welcomed. After all, I learn more from considering the ideas of people who disagree with me than from affirmation from those who do, as much as I like positive feedback.

People mostly asked what Israel was supposed to do, given that it faces an implacable enemy. While I am not fond of arguing counterfactuals, this question is relevant because the war isn’t over. There is still time for Israel to change its approach to the issue of civilian harm.

The Gaza War shares characteristics with other conflicts, from which we can draw lessons. The battle for the ISIS stronghold of Raqqa in 2017 and the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009 are particularly striking. Similar to Israel-Hamas, both conflicts involved state actors trying to dislodge a dug-in terrorist organization. In fact, the RAND Corporation, a well-respected think tank that wrote a report for the U.S. Department of Defense on Raqqa in 2022, wrote the U.S. faced “ruthless and committed adversaries, high-intensity urban combat environments, and complex geopolitical dilemmas” The report in general discussed how the U.S. military “could cause significant civilian harm despite a deeply ingrained commitment to the law of war.” Many supporters of Israel could relate to these statements.

So, here’s what I suggest Israel could have done differently and could still do differently to mitigate civilian harm:

1. Put an official in charge of minimizing civilian harm so it will actually happen

Everyone talks about mitigating civilian harm, but no one has that as their job description. There is a well-known proverb that when everyone is responsible, no one is responsible. RAND found the same problem in Raqqa. If Israel were to have a member of its general staff with the portfolio of mitigating civilian harm, that would necessarily reverberate through the system and alleviate civilian suffering. And perhaps Israel would adopt some of the following practices that were also recommended by the RAND report for the U.S. Department of Defense to mitigate civilian harm, including starvation.

2. Flood Gaza with humanitarian aid to prevent starvation while depriving Hamas of revenue

The RAND report recommended working more closely with humanitarian aid organizations to better alleviate civilian suffering. Israel did the opposite, shutting down 400 aid distribution centers and replacing them with four centers managed by the privately-run, Israeli funded Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. It’s been an unmitigated disaster. In the chaos of lawless and desperate Gaza, hundreds have been killed trying to collect aid, while 240 people, 107 of them children, have reportedly starved to death. Even if one disputes that figure, hundreds of thousands are objectively undernourished.

Flooding Gaza with humanitarian aid would save lives. Period. No one would starve to death or be killed desperately trying to collect aid from an insufficient number of locations in areas where law and order have ceased to exist. Flooding Gaza with aid would also likely benefit the hostages. Returning hostages have noted that when Israel did punitive actions against Hamas prisoners or Gaza, they were punished. It certainly seems their condition has deteriorated since March.

Moreover, a surge of aid would not only put an end to the debate over the starvation of the enclave but also undercut any economic benefits Hamas or criminal gangs currently enjoy from the status quo. When flour costs $30-$45/kilo, terrorists and criminals can make a lot more money off them than if they cost $1/kilo.

Even the Israeli government acknowledges that food isn’t the problem for Hamas. Limiting food aid doesn’t help defeat Hamas, it only makes vulnerable civilians suffer. By flooding Gaza with aid, food prices would collapse, Hamas and the criminal gangs would lose a valuable source of money and Israel would avoid an unforced PR disaster.

Israel’s deprivation of aid is more like what Sri Lanka did at the end of its civil war in 2009. In that case, only three months passed between the first warnings of starvation and the end of the war. In contrast, it’s been five months since Israel cut off all aid and then allowed in only limited amounts, with no end in sight. So, the number of victims is liable to continue climbing

3. Open an exit corridor for civilians to reach Israeli-controlled territory so they can be kept permanently out of harm’s way until the war is over

Creating an exit corridor so civilians can escape the fighting to Israel-controlled territory takes them permanently out of harm’s way. It is more effective than creating so-called “safe zones” near areas Hamas still controls. As we’ve seen, Israel has repeatedly attacked safe zones to kill combatants hiding inside. That couldn’t happen in Israeli-controlled zones, where food would be sufficient.

The counterargument is that housing civilians in Israeli-controlled territory would be costly, but that would be a small price to pay compared to the value of life. In any event, the international community would surely pitch in to offset those costs. Moreover, keeping civilians safe would protect Israel’s international reputation.

As the RAND report acknowledged, the flow of 200,000 refugees out of Raqqa not only reduced civilian casualties but also sped up the job of the allied forces fighting ISIS. A fringe benefit was that some civilians provided human intelligence about ISIS inside the city, a source that had been sorely lacking.

Instead, Israel has behaved more like the Sri Lankan military did toward the end of its civil war against the LTTE in 2008-09. It pushed some 330,000 Tamil civilians into a shrinking zone, killing around 40,000 of them in the closing months as it shelled LTTE-held areas indiscriminately. A UN report slammed Sri Lanka for not allowing civilians a chance to escape to truly safe territory but instead pushing them into “safe zones” where food was scarce.

Concluding thoughts

Surely, the lesson from Raqqa is that a government can both observe the laws of war and still kill too many civilians. Sri Lanka, meanwhile, is a cautionary tale about how high the death toll can get when the military keeps civilians between it and the enemy, doesn’t work with humanitarian groups and denies civilians sufficient humanitarian aid.

Wittingly or unwittingly, Israel’s actions in Gaza have yielded results that share traits with Raqqa and Sri Lanka. It has allowed civilians to remain in harm’s way while creating a chaotic situation conducive to hunger and starvation. The Israeli leadership may try to convince itself that it is mitigating civilian harm, but the lessons from Raqqa and Sri Lanka say otherwise. Israel could change its approach for Gaza City, where a million civilians are seeking shelter. As I see it, Israel’s leaders, like their nation, have been stuck in the limbic system of their brain, where fear overrules reason. With their collective trauma guiding them, there are no signs that they will change track in time to mitigate the suffering.

Palestinians collecting aid in Northern Gaza.

P.S. Shira Efron, who has led the Israel program at RAND, just wrote a very powerful essay that captures how Israel’s pain has blinded it to Gaza’s suffering. Taken together with my piece here, she compassionately explains why Israelis aren’t interested in doing what I think they should be doing. I highly recommend it.